Lender discrimination during default by Laura, Mickey et al.
University of New Orleans 
ScholarWorks@UNO 
College of Urban and Public Affairs (CUPA) 
Working Papers, 1991-2000 Department of Planning and Urban Studies 
1999 
Lender discrimination during default 
Mickey Laura 
University of New Orleans 
Vern K. Baxter 
University of New Orleans 
Bridget M. Bordelon 
University of New Orleans 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.uno.edu/cupa_wp 
Recommended Citation 
Laura, Mickey; Baxter, Vern K.; and Bordelon, Bridget M., "Lender discrimination during default" (1999). 
College of Urban and Public Affairs (CUPA) Working Papers, 1991-2000. Paper 10. 
https://scholarworks.uno.edu/cupa_wp/10 
This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of Planning and Urban Studies at 
ScholarWorks@UNO. It has been accepted for inclusion in College of Urban and Public Affairs (CUPA) Working 
Papers, 1991-2000 by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UNO. For more information, please contact 
scholarworks@uno.edu. 
LENDER DISCRIMINATION DURING DEFAULT
Mickey Lauria
College of Urban and Public Affairs
University of New Orleans
New Orleans, LA 70148.
504-280-7106 (voice)
 504-280-6272 (fax)
E-MAIL: MLauria@uno.edu.  
and
Vern Baxter
Department of Sociology
University of New Orleans
New Orleans, LA 70148
E-MAIL: Vbaxter@uno.edu
and
Bridget Bordelon
College of Urban and Public Affairs
University of New Orleans
This project was funded by the Fannie Mae Foundation. Support was also received from the
Geography and Regional Science Program of the National Science Foundation, SBR-9422580
and HUD’s National Center for the Revitalization of Inner Cities. We would like to acknowledge
the assistance and cooperation of the Orleans Parish Civil Sheriff’s office, particularly Civil
Sheriff Paul Valteau and Deputy Sheriff Todd Thedy. Our analysis would have been impossible
without the assistance and cooperation of those individuals who were foreclosed upon and
agreed to participate in the study. We would also like to thank Joyce Levine, Sarah Todd, Kelly
Caldwell, Paul Cramer, Toomas Soosaar, and Greg Soll for their assistance with the telephone
survey and Zachary Klaas, and Donhang Zhang for their assistance at various stages of the
project. Any opinions, findings and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material
are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Fannie Mae Foundation,
the National Science Foundation, or the U.S. Government. 
Abstract
We evaluate lender discrimination during the mortgage default process. A telephone
survey was conducted to evaluate the extent of lender discrimination in defaults that lead to
foreclosure in New Orleans, Louisiana between 1985-1990. We use these data to estimate the
independent effects of race and neighborhood characteristics on the extent of lender assistance or
forbearance during the foreclosure process. Our analysis indicates that the proportion of black
residents in the neighborhood where the property was foreclosed is a more significant predictor
of forbearance than the race of the borrower. This is a foreboding indication of the possibility
that recent gains in black home buying may be partially offset by the persistence of residential
segregation in U.S. cities.
LENDER DISCRIMINATION DURING DEFAULT
Controversy continues to define the literature on race discrimination in urban credit markets. For
every study which shows that banks make fewer loans in predominantly minority communities
than in majority white ones or that banks discriminate against individual minority loan
applicants, another study concludes that race discrimination has all but disappeared from housing
finance. Some scholars argue that place discrimination has replaced individual discrimination or
that only the interaction of an individual’s race and neighborhood characteristics reveals the
sources of potentially discriminatory behavior (Ambrose and Capone 1996; Holloway 1998).
Another stream of research is criticized for omitting critical variables related to credit worthiness
or for using counterfactual methods and logic to address critical issues related to race
discrimination. One clear message from this literature is a mandate to continue research on
various aspects of discrimination in urban credit markets. 
This article addresses several important issues in the literature on discrimination in urban
credit markets through an investigation of lender forbearance in the mortgage default process.
The idea is that a shift in focus away from loan origination and onto the mortgage default process
may create some new insight. Is there race discrimination in the mortgage default process? How
does credit worthiness compare with other reasons for default? Are individual or neighborhood
characteristics more closely linked to discrimination in the default process? The article proceeds
with a review of several issues in the literature on race discrimination in housing finance. Results
will then be presented from an analysis of census data and data from a survey of forbearance in 
the default process that was administered to 197 homeowners who were foreclosed on in New
Orleans between 1985 and 1990.
RACE DISCRIMINATION IN HOUSING FINANCE
Race discrimination in residential mortgage lending has been empirically evaluated using a
counterfactual model based in the economics of discrimination (Becker 1971; Berkovec et al
1996). The argument made is that if lenders consider blacks and/or other minority applicants a
higher default risk, all other things being equal, they will require higher returns on their
investment and will impose more stringent underwriting standards. This practice is structured to
monetarily compensate for the higher default risk and decrease other known risk factors. If
minorities are held to stricter loan origination standards then it follows that minority borrowers
should exhibit a lower default and foreclosure rate than non-minority borrowers. The
counterfactual argument is then made that if minority borrowers do not experience a lower
default and foreclosure rate, then the risk reduction compensatory practice was either not used
(i.e., statistical discrimination based on race did not occur), or the stringency of the underwriting
standards was not severe enough to compensate for the actual increased risk. 
While this approach has been severely criticized methodologically for omitting critical
variables from the empirical models estimated (Galster 1996; Ross 1996; Yinger 1996), the
counterfactual argument itself has not. We will address a logical flaw in the counterfactual
argument. We assert, along with Yinger (1996), Ross (1996; 1997), and Ambrose and Capone
(1996, 90), that the logical flaw in the counterfactual argument is the unexamined assumption
that racial discrimination is not practiced during the mortgage default and foreclosure process.
We believe this is a particularly grievous assumption when empirical tests only address whether
or not racial discrimination occurred at an earlier point in the residential mortgage process. 
An examination of potential discrimination in the default process provides insight into
several other issues in the literature. One issue concerns the possibility of race related yet
unobserved credit unworthiness. Most research on the topic is limited methodologically because
the lender provides all information about the mortgage process. For example, Ambrose and
Capone’s (1996) useful study of the default process does not resolve the problem because they
use lender data to infer that race related credit unworthiness is absent. We start from an
alternative theory that cultural barriers between white loan officers and minority borrowers
reinforce discriminatory myths that reduce trust and militate against nondiscriminatory loan
practices (Holloway 1998, 258-59). To address the issue empirically our survey of foreclosed
homeowners contains questions that ask the reason for default, whether borrowers received any
lender assistance and/or forbearance, and how they attempted to resolve the default problem (see
Appendix A). These data allow us to examine whether discrimination occurred during the default
and foreclosure process in New Orleans during the late 1980s.
A most contentious issue in the literature is obviously whether discrimination based on
race is still practiced in urban credit markets. A related issue concerns the extent to which any
discrimination that exists is directed against individuals or against neighborhoods.
Discrimination against minority individuals in the mortgage lending process is illegal. However,
widespread evidence supports the conclusion that many whites still prefer to live in all white
neighborhoods and that many financial professionals place obstacles in the path of minorities
who want to move into these areas (Farley et al 1978; Farley et al 1994; Massey and Denton
1993). Steven Holloway (1998) recently reported that being black significantly increases the
probability of having a loan application denied in the all white neighborhoods of Columbus,
Ohio. However, the uncovering of individual level discrimination in loan origination is
complicated by the fact that it is so highly correlated with variables like credit history, wealth,
and loan to value ratio that can legitimately be used to allocate credit (Munnell et al 1996).
Despite these difficulties, scholars like Geoffrey Tootell (1996, 1078) insist that many lenders
remain reluctant to make loans to minorities wherever they apply.
Geoffery Tootell (1996) is also among the scholars who believe that the evidence for
redlining, the denying of credit to a neighborhood, is weak. The case is made that legislation like
the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) and Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) has
been largely successful in monitoring the lending practices of financial institutions so that
redlining does not continue. But the issue remains a tricky one. Despite revealed preferences to
live in integrated neighborhoods, most black home buyers actually buy into segregated ones
(Clark 1991; Immergluck 1998). Continued place stratification is attributed partially to racial
myths and stereotypes that condition decisions about lending and residential location (Massey
and Denton 1993; Stone 1986). These racial stereotypes then interact with economic concerns
about the potential for declining house values in minority neighborhoods to restrict lending in
these areas. The economic association of undesirable future outcomes with minority group
membership perpetuates discrimination in lending practices to minority dominated
neighborhoods. This logic can be extended to investigate the potential for place-based
discrimination in the default process. We address the question of whether more forbearance is
granted delinquent borrowers in majority white than in majority black neighborhoods. The denial
of forbearance to borrowers in predominantly black neighborhoods would be read as
discrimination against those neighborhoods.
METHODOLOGY 
The data used in the analysis come from three sources: Civil District Court records; a telephone
survey; and the U.S. Census. We first collected data on 4,154 residential mortgage foreclosures
in New Orleans between 1985 and 1990 from Civil District Court records. We then conducted a
telephone survey of persons whose property in New Orleans was foreclosed between 1985 and
1990. Finally, aggregate data were collected at the block group level for New Orleans from the
1980 and 1990 U.S. Census of Population and Housing, Summary tape Files 3-A (U.S. Census
Bureau 1982; 1992). The Census data were merged with the survey data and the data on
residential mortgage foreclosures. 
Using the total population of foreclosures in New Orleans from 1985 to 1990, we
employed a proportionate stratified sampling technique (see Appendix B) to construct a
sampling frame of 2,224 phone numbers of people who had been foreclosed on in that period.
The sampling frame was tested and found to be representative of the population of foreclosures.
We then selected a proportional random sample of 876 foreclosure cases which was stratified by
race and income. The final interview sample contains 197 respondents. The low response rate to
the telephone survey is understandable given the fact that any person whose property is
foreclosed on has moved from that address. In addition, we were contacting people seven to
twelve years after their foreclosure experience. In order to assess the representativeness of the
sample, we performed a one-sample ‘t’ test to compare the means of variables in the sample of
completed questionnaires with the means of variables in the population of foreclosures (see
Appendix C). Based on the test results, there is no statistically significant difference between the
population means and the sample means on any of the variable tested. We are therefore confident
that our sample well represents the population of foreclosures in New Orleans from 1985 to
1990. 
The survey data enriches the analysis in two ways. The socio-economic and demographic
data collected in the survey allow us to avoid ecological problems associated with attaching
block group data (spatial group characteristics) to loan specific data (individual characteristics).
In addition, the data on lender treatment during default allow us to directly evaluate lender
discrimination in the default process. A full description of all variables used in the analysis is
found in table 1. 
TABLE 1
Variable Description and Measurement
Acronym Variable description  Measurement or Source Mean 
(SD)
Monthdel number of months delinquent prior
to default
Court records 5.94
(3.93)
Notelife number of years between loan
origination and loan default
Court records 5.43
(3.92)
Ltv1 Loan amount at default divided by
mean value of owner-occupied
housing in the block group 1990
Court records 1.34
(1.20)
Delinqnt Were you delinquent on mortgage
payments prior to this default
Survey .193
Valu9080 percent change in mean value of
owner occupied housing, 1980-90
mean value of owner occupied
housing 1990 minus the mean
value of owner occupied
housing 1980 divided by the
mean value of owner occupied
housing 1980 
-.038
(.46)
Propbl80 proportion black in block group,
1980
black population divided by the
total population in block group
.615
(.320)
Income Total household income at time of
default 
Survey, categories based on
proportions of city median
Race Race of borrower Survey .652
Rsdflt reason for default Survey
Emploss default related to employment loss Survey .269
Hoodown default related to neighborhood
decline
Survey .066
Nopay default related to inability to make
payments
Survey .188
Persloss default related to divorce or illness Survey .163
Speclose default related to decline in rental
market
Survey .234
Occudef occupation at time of default Survey - categorized below by
1990 Census of Occupations
      Bluecoll precision production/craft/repair,
machine operators/assemblers/
inspectors, transportation/material
moving, & handlers/equipment
cleaners/helpers/laborers 
.113
Clerk administrative support occupations
(including clerical) 
.103
Mgrpro managerial/professional,
professional speciality, &
technicians/related support 
.289
Saleser sales, private household, protective
service, & service occupations
.273
Unemp unemployed .191
Note: Categorical proportions indicated are for positive, while race is proportion black.
We estimated ordinary least square (OLS) regression models to determine the effects of
race of borrower, racial composition of block group, total household income at time of default,
loan to value ratio at time of default, relative change in value of owner-occupied housing in the
block group, credit history (prior delinquency), occupation at time of default, and reason for
default on the extent of lender forbearance. The main hypothesis is that delinquent black
borrowers receive less forbearance from lending institutions than delinquent white borrowers.
Alternative hypotheses concern the effects of employment status, reason for default, and location
of default on the fate of delinquent loans.
The dependent variable in the analysis is the number of months a borrower was
delinquent before the bank declared the loan to be in default. There was little point in using any
other indicator of forbearance (e.g., FHA mortgage assistance or payment rescheduling) because
these options were made available to so few delinquent borrowers in the sample. Independent
predictors are drawn from the survey of foreclosed homeowners, data collected from court
records of foreclosed homeowners surveyed, and census data on the block group characteristics
of the properties foreclosed.
LENDER DISCRIMINATION DURING DEFAULT IN NEW ORLEANS 
Descriptive Statistics
As indicated above, means of variables in the survey data were not statistically different
from the means of variables in the population of residential mortgage foreclosures in New
Orleans. The real median household income in block groups with representatives in the sample
was approximately $19,800 in 1980 and declined to $16,200 by 1990; while the real mean value
of owner-occupied housing in these block group declined from approximately $48,300 in 1980
to $41,600 in 1990. These block groups experienced a 10% average increase in black population
while experiencing a net out-migration of approximately 87 households (273 individuals each)
and a 3% foreclosure rate (see Lauria 1998 for a detailed descriptive account of foreclosure in
New Orleans). Thirty-three percent of the respondents were white and 62 % black. The mean
duration of mortgage prior to foreclosure was 5.4 years and the mean monthly housing cost was
$623.
 To evaluate whether there was differential treatment in the default/forbearance process
based on the race of the borrower or the racial composition of the neighborhood we asked
individuals whether the lending institution offered any remedial assistance such as FHA
mortgage assignment, rearrangement or decrease of monthly payments, lower interest rate, or
any other method of helping them meet their obligations. While only 19% (38 individuals) had
ever been delinquent with mortgage payments in the past, lenders in New Orleans were not very
flexible during this period. The mean time to default was 5.94 months, while only 10% of our
sample (20 individuals) received any form of forbearance (e.g., rearrangement of payment
schedule, decreased monthly mortgage payments, or lower interest rates), with two individuals
assigned to the FHA Mortgage assistance program. In simple racial comparisons, black
respondents were significantly less likely than whites to receive lower interest rates (see Table 2)
or a reduction in monthly payments (see Table 3). This suggests that what little lender
forbearance was provided, was provided disproportionately to white borrowers. One has to be
careful not to infer too much from the bivariate relationships because, at the same time, black
respondents were significantly less likely than whites to be employed in better paying
managerial/professional occupations (p<.001, Fisher’s Exact Test), were more likely to be
unemployed (see Table 4), and were more likely to have been delinquent on mortgage payments
prior to this default (see Table 5). All of these factors suggest a higher risk of default among
black borrowers.
TABLE 2
Lender Forbearance: Lower Interest Rates
Yes No Total
White 6 58 64
Black 3 115 118
Total 9 173 182
Pearson Chi-Square 4.12, with 1 degree of freedom, p < .05 (2-sided).
Table 3
Lender Forbearance: Rearrange Payments
Yes No Total
White 9 56 65
Black 5 116 172
Total 14 172 186
Pearson Chi-Square 5.73, with 1 degree of freedom, p < .05 (2-sided)
Survey respondents were asked why they defaulted on their mortgages. The distribution
of reasons for default is as follows: 23.4% defaulted because it was rental property lost in a
depressed market; 26.7% due to unemployment/underemployment or job change; 12.2% due to
divorce or separation; 4.1% because of illness or death; 18.8% could not make payments or sell
the property; 6.6% cited neighborhood decline; 2.5% Resolution Trust Company (RTC) or bank
takeover; 4.1% business failure; and 1.5% other. In simple racial comparisons, black respondents
are not significantly different (Fisher’s Exact Test) from white respondents in terms of listing
rental property market decline, divorce or illness, or inability to make payments or sell the
property as the reason for default. Black respondents are significantly more likely to list
unemployment/underemployment or job change (see Table 6) and are less likely to list
neighborhood decline (see Table 7) as the reason for default. These findings suggest that while
blacks were disproportionately affected by the oil related recession (see Lauria and Baxter 1999),
they did not face discrimination based on their race during the default and foreclosure process.
TABLE 4
Unemployed at Time of Default
Yes No Total
White 7 58 65
Black 29 93 122
Yes No Total
Total 36 151 187
Fisher’ Exact Test, p = .023 (1-sided)
TABLE 5
Delinquent on Mortgage Payments Prior to Current Delinquency
Yes No Total
White 5 53 58
Black 32 90 122
Total 37 143 180
Pearson chi square, 7.46 with 1 degree of freedom, p < .01; Fisher’ Exact Test, p = .004 (1-sided)
TABLE 6
Default Related to Employment Loss
Yes No Total
White 9 56 65
Black 41 81 122
Total 50 137 187
Fisher’ Exact Test, p = .002 (1-sided)
TABLE 7
Default Due to Neighborhood Decline
Yes No Total
White 9 56 65
Black 3 119 122
Total 12 175 187
Pearson chi square, 9.16 with 1 degree of freedom, p < .01; Fisher’ Exact Test, p = .004 
(1-sided)
In order to evaluate whether the pre-existing racial composition of the neighborhood of
the delinquent property affected lender forbearance, we tested many of these same relationships
with a categorical version of proportion black in a black group (probl80): 0-30% black =1, 31-
50%=2, 51-70%=3 and 71-100%=4. Neither occupation at time of default or employment related
default were significantly related to the racial composition of neighborhoods. This suggests that
particular areas were not discriminated against based on their social class composition. Rental
property market decline was a significantly more important reason for default in majority black
and solidly black neighborhoods (see Table 8). Recall that black respondents were less likely to
default because of neighborhood decline and that rental property market was not a significantly
more important reason for default for white versus black respondents. These findings suggest
that white landlords in black neighborhoods were more likely to default than black landlords.
Correspondingly, delinquent borrowers in majority white neighborhoods were more likely to
default because of the inability to make mortgage payments or sell their property (see Table 9).
Let us now proceed to a multivariate analysis in order to unpack these relationships and further
examine their significance.
TABLE 8
Default due to Rental Market Decline
% Black 1980 Yes No Total
0-30% 5 41 46
31-50% 18 18
51-70% 11 29 40
71-100% 30 63 93
Total 46 151 197
Pearson Chi-Square = 13.99 with 3 degrees of freedom, p <.01 (2-sided)
TABLE 9
Default due to Inability to Make Mortgage Payments or Sell Property
% Black 1980 Yes No Total
0-30% 17 29 46
31-50% 6 12 18
51-70% 33 7 40
% Black 1980 Yes No Total
71-100% 78 15 93
Total 45 152 197
Pearson Chi-Square = 13.99, p < .05 (2-sided)
Multivariate Analysis
The OLS regression results reveal some interesting relationships that help us address the
research questions outlined above. Relative change in the value of owner-occupied housing
(Valu9080) is most significantly and positively related to the number of months a mortgage is in
default prior to foreclosure. Value of owner-occupied housing has the largest unstandardized and
standardized coefficients and the highest t-ratio in all models. Clearly, if property in the
neighborhood where a foreclosed property is located sustains its market value, lenders are
willing to allow delinquent borrowers more time to resolve their payment problems. At the same
time, these results suggest that the racial composition of the neighborhood where delinquent
property is located is a more significant predictor of forbearance than the race of the borrower.
Properties were delinquent significantly fewer months before default in neighborhoods with a
larger proportion of black residents, while race of the individual borrower is not a significant
predictor of months delinquent before foreclosure. This finding provides some evidence of racial
discrimination in the default process but points more strongly toward discrimination against the
neighborhood than discrimination against the minority individual.
Separate dummy variable regressions were run of months delinquent before foreclosure
on reasons for default and on employment status. Borrowers who defaulted because of divorce or
illness received significantly more forbearance than those who defaulted because they could not
make payments and could not sell the property. Default due to employment loss is moderately
statistically significant (p < . 072) and receives the second longest delinquent period when
compared with those who are unable to make mortgage payments or sell their property. At the
same time, while not statistically significant, it seems that delinquent investors in rental property
were defaulted on quicker than people who defaulted for any other reason.
TABLE 10
OLS Regression of Forbearance on Predictors of Default 
(Dependent Variable = Months in Default)
 Model 1 (p =.001)      Model 2 (p =.000)
Variablea   b    (t-ratio) Significance   b    (t-ratio) Significance
Constant 6.65     (3.91) .000  5.68    (3.26) .001
LTV 8.74E-2  (.197) .844  .164    (.374) .709
Proportion Black in Block Group, 1980 -2.27    (-2.25) .026 -2.53   (-2.50) .014
Total Household Income at Default -7.41E-2 (-.445) .657 2.00E-2  (.118) .906
Relative Change in Value of Owner-
occupied Housing in Block Group
2.50     (3.87) .000 2.69     (4.23) .000
Race of Borrower -.870    (-1.14) .257 -.990   (-1.29) .201
Delinquent on Prior Mortgage Payments .814     (1.14) .257  .728    (1.03) .304
Reason for Defaultb
   Rental Property Market -2.39E-2 (-.027) .978
   Neighborhood Decline 1.28     (.823) .412
   Divorce or Illness 2.64     (2.79) .006
   Employment Loss 1.45     (1.82) .071
R 2 .148  .215
Adjusted R2 .109  .154
N 140  140
(a) See text for data sources, table 1 for description of variables.
(b) Omitted reason for default is Unable to Pay or Sell.
CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
The analysis of lender forbearance during default presented in this article is consistent with the
findings of Ambrose and Capone (1996) in that we found little discrimination based on the race
of the borrower. On the other hand, these results are inconsistent with recent research which
suggests that there has been a decline in lender redlining of particular neighborhoods based on
racial composition (Tootell 1996). Our analysis of lender forbearance, with forbearance defined
as time allowed in delinquency prior to default declaration, indicates that relative change in the
value of owner-occupied housing and prior racial composition of the block group are the most
significant predictors in all models. The correlation between these two variables is rather small
(.128) but it is statistically significant, which suggests that they measure distinct phenomena. It
should therefore be clear that the racial composition of the neighborhood is an important
consideration in lender forbearance, net of all other factors considered. It is much too premature
to dismiss the influence of cultural stereotypes and racial preferences on racial discrimination in
residential location and lending practices in American cities.
The discovery of statistically insignificant relationships are an important part of our
story. Loan to value ratio, total household income at the time of default, and prior credit history
(measured as a prior delinquency) are nowhere near significantly related to time in default before
foreclosure (see Table 10, model 2). This reinforces the conclusion that during this recessionary
period in New Orleans lenders were more concerned with the characteristics of the
neighborhoods in which delinquencies occurred than with any borrower or loan characteristics. 
The results presented in this article are also largely consistent with Steven Holloway’s
analysis of the relationship of lender discrimination and the racial composition of neighborhood
in Columbus Ohio (1998), and Daniel Immergluck’s (1998) assertion that increases in black
home buying are occurring in highly segregated black neighborhoods, which reinforces racial
residential segregation. The results presented in this article are cause for some alarm because
they indicate that during recessionary periods highly segregated neighborhoods with many black
owner-occupants are likely to face disproportionate default and foreclosure pressure. Part of this
pressure appears to be institutional discrimination which further depresses housing markets and
the quality of life in predominantly minority neighborhoods. 
1. In Louisiana appraisals are not required for foreclosure proceedings. Since only 25% of our
survey respondents had property appraisals at the time of foreclosure, we could not construct a
loan to value ratio that used such data. Instead we used the 1990 mean value of owner-occupied
housing in the block group of the foreclosed property. This provides us with a loan to value ratio
of the property to the average value of owner-occupied property in the neighborhood in which it
resides. While insignificant in our models, this surrogate variable provided better models than
our other potential surrogate variable (Notelife).  Notelife measures a slightly different concept.
As Notelife increases, the amount of equity a homeowner accrues increases while the principal
loan amount should decrease. Thus, one would expect Notelife and Ltv to be negatively
correlated. Notelife is a better measure of the amount of equity to be lost through foreclosure and
thus as it increases the probability for default and perhaps time to default should decrease. On
the other hand, with the loan to value ratio used, as it increases the probability for default and
time to default should increase.  
NOTES
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Appendix A: Telephone Script
Fannie Housing Foundation Lender Discrimination and Housing Foreclosure
Survey Project
INTRODUCTION
Hello, may I speak to (name of interviewee)?
Hi, this is (name of interviewer) from the University of New Orleans. We're doing
research for the Fannie Mae Foundation on the effects of housing foreclosures on neighborhoods
and individuals in New Orleans. The research we are conducting is specifically about individuals
who were foreclosed upon in New Orleans from 1985-1990; so the information we need has to
come from those individuals. We located your name in the Civil District Court public case
docket. Although those listings are available to the public, UNO and the Fannie Mae Foundation
will not republish your name. If you help us out with this survey, your answers will be kept
confidential.  Would you mind answering a few questions to help us out with the project. It will
take roughly ten minutes.
[If "No."] Is there a time I can call back that is more convenient? 
[Record day and time on list for call back.]
[If “No.”] Well, thank you for your time.
[Record refusal on list]
[If "Yes."] Terrific. Let's begin, then.
SURVEY
1. First of all, I need to make sure I am speaking with (say and spell the name of person) whose
property at (list the address of the property) was foreclosed upon on (date of foreclosure.) Is this
right?
[If "No."] I am sorry to have bothered you. Thank you for your time. [Indicate that it was the
wrong individual on the your sample list.]
[If "Yes," move to next question.]
2. All right. I have your current address as (address given on the list). Is that right?
[If "No."] Okay, what is your current address?
[If "Yes," move to next question.]
[If "Why do you need to know this?"] Our project involves understanding the effects of
foreclosures on different neighborhoods.
3. What were the reasons for your mortgage default?
I am going to read you a list of common reasons why people are foreclosed upon. Please tell me
how important these reasons were regarding your default?
A. Could not afford monthly payments.
Very important Somewhat important Not very important Not a reason
(1) (2) (3) (4)
__ __ __ __
B. Not able to sell the house.
Very important Somewhat important Not very important Not a reason
(1) (2) (3) (4)
__ __ __ __
C. Loss of income.
Very important Somewhat important Not very important Not a reason
(1) (2) (3) (4)
__ __ __ __
D. There was a significant illness or accident in the family which increased medical expenses.
Very important Somewhat important Not very important Not a reason
(1) (2) (3) (4)
__ __ __ __
E. Divorce from husband/wife.
Very important Somewhat important Not very important Not a reason
(1) (2) (3) (4)
__ __ __ __
F. Separation from husband/wife.
Very important Somewhat important Not very important Not a reason
(1) (2) (3) (4)
__ __ __ __
G. Loss of employment.
Very important Somewhat important Not very important Not a reason
(1) (2) (3) (4)
__ __ __ __
[If respondent answers 1 or 2 to Question 3G, then ask Question 3H]
H. How long were you unemployed before the foreclosure took place?
4. Were you ever delinquent with your payments on this mortgage prior to the delinquency that
lead to the foreclosure?
A. If yes, how was that prior delinquency handled?
5. Were you ever given delinquency assistance with the FHA Mortgage Assignment Program?
6. How many months were you behind with your payments when the bank decided to foreclose
on your mortgage?
7. Did the bank offer to rearrange your payment schedule, lower the interest rate or otherwise
decrease your monthly payment prior to deciding to foreclose?
Okay, for our project we're also going to need some basic demographic information so we can
attempt to explain how the foreclosure process in the city works. Once again, any information
you share with us will be held confidential.
8. Which of the following describe your racial/ethnic background?
1 White
2 Black
3 Hispanic
4 American Indian, Eskimo or Aleut
5 Asian or Pacific Islander
8 Other background [If so, have respondent specify.]
9 Don't know/refused to answer
9. What is your current age?
10. I'm going to read some categories of income. Please tell me when I get to your TOTAL
yearly household income in (year of foreclosure.) In other words, how much did everyone living
with you at that time make in that year?
1 Below $13,000
2 $13,001 to $21,000
3 $21,001 to $32,000
4 $32,001 to $39,000
5 $39,001 to $47,000
6 $47,001 to $53,000
7 $53,001 and over
9 Don't know/refused to answer
11. What was your housing situation immediately after the foreclosure; were you a homeowner,
a private renter, a renter in public housing, staying with friends or family, or what?
1 Homeowner
2 Homeowner and owns rental property
3 Private renter
4 Public housing renter
5 Stayed with friends or family
8 Other housing situation [If so, please have respondent specify.]
9 Don't know/refused to answer
[If answer for Question 11 is 2, then ask Question 11A, otherwise go on to Question 12.]
A. How many properties did you continue to own after the foreclosure?
12. Were you personally occupying the foreclosed property at the time of default?
13. What was your job at the time of the default?
14. What was your (husband/wife)'s occupation at the time of the default?
15. I'm now going to read some categories of income. Please tell me when I get to your TOTAL
yearly household income for this past year.
1 Below $17,000
2 $17,001 to $27,000
 3 $27,001 to $41,000
 4 $41,001 to $51,000
5 $51,001 to $62,000
6 $62,001 to $69,000
7 $69,001 and over
 9 Don’t know/refused to answer
16. What is your current occupation?
17. What is your (husband/wife)'s current occupation.
18. What is your current housing situation? Have you purchased another home, are you renting
an apartment, in public housing, staying with friends or family, or what?
1 Now a homeowner
2 Now own a home and rental property
3 Now a private renter
4 Now a public housing renter
5 Now staying with friends or family
8 Now have other housing situation [If so, please have respondent specify.]
9 Don't know/refused to answer
[If answer to Question 18 is 3, then ask Question 18A, otherwise go on to Question 19.]
A. Assuming you had the money, would you be interested in purchasing another home?
1 Yes
2 No
9 Don't know/refused to answer
19. How much do you currently spend each month for housing?
CONCLUSION
Okay, that's all the questions we have.
20. Would you be willing to participate in a follow-up interview or focus group in the future?
[If "What does that involve?" explain follow-up interview or focus group.]
1 Yes
2 No
Appendix B: Sampling
Foreclosure Population
Percentage Black - 1980
Income 0-30% 31-50% 51-70% 71-100% Total
$0-$9,272 9  [.2] 3  [.1] 39  [.9] 340 [8.2] 39 [9.4]
$9,273-$13,908 79 [1.9] 75 [1.8] 233 [5.6] 618[14.9] 1005[24.2]
$13,909-$23,182 299 [7.2] 238 [5.7] 244 [5.9] 614[14.8] 1395[33.6]
$23,183 and above 666[16.0] 190 [4.6] 207 [5.0] 291 [7.1] 1359[32.7]
Total 1053[25.4] 506[12.2] 723[17.4] 1868[45.0] 4150
Spatially matched foreclosure data set stratified by race and income. Numbers in brackets
represent the percentage of population in the cell.
Telephone Number Sampling Frame
Percentage Black - 1980
Income 0-30% 31-50% 51-70% 71-100% Total
$0-$9,272 5  [.2] 3  [.1] 20  [.9] 204 [9.2] 232[10.4]
$9,273-$13,908 45 [2.0] 35 [1.6] 122 [5.5] 340[15.3] 542[24.4]
$13,909-$23,182 144 [6.5] 129 [5.8] 136 [6.1] 335[15.1] 744[33.5]
$23,183 and above 356[16.0] 109 [4.9] 91 [4.1] 150 [6.7] 706[31.7]
Total 550[24.7] 276[12.4] 369[16.6] 1029[46.3] 2224
Spatially matched foreclosure data set with phone numbers. Numbers in brackets represent the
percentage of population in the cell.
Telephone Survey Oversample
(Stratified and Randomly drawn)
Percentage Black - 1980
Income 0-30% 31-50% 51-70% 71-100% Total
$0-$9,272 3 [0.3] 1 [0.1] 9 [1.0] 75 [9.6] 88[10.0]
$9,273-$13,908 26 [3.0] 29 [3.3] 54 [6.2] 128[14.6] 237[27.0]
$13,909-$23,182 61 [7.0] 49 [5.6] 47 [5.4] 123[14.0] 280[32.0]
$23,183 and above 131[15.0] 37 [4.2] 44 [5.0] 59 [6.7] 271[30.9]
Total 221[25.2] 116[13.2] 154[17.6] 385[44.0] 876
Over sample drawn from sampling frame. Numbers in brackets represent the percentage of total
sample in the cell.
Survey Respondents
Percentage Black - 1980
Income 0-30% 31-50% 51-70% 71-100% Total
$0-$9,272 2 [1.0] 19 [9.6] 21[10.7]
$9,273-$13,908 6 [3.0] 2[1.0] 13 [6.6] 31[15.7] 52[26.4]
$13,909-$23,182 15 [7.6] 8[4.0] 13 [6.6] 27[13.7] 63[32.0]
$23,183 and above 25[12.7] 8[4.0] 12 [6.1] 16 [8.1] 61[31.0]
Total 46[23.4] 18[9.1] 40[20.3] 93[47.2] 197
Survey respondents stratified by race and income. Numbers in brackets represent the percentage
of total respondents in the cell.
APPENDIX C
Difference of Means Tests on Selected Variables 
Variable Population Mean
 (N=4154)
Sample Mean
(N=197)
 t df Significance
(2-tailed)
Hsinc80 19506.54 18842.18 -1.036 196 .301
Hsinc90 16382.70 16211.24 -.267 196 .790
Meanva80 50015.79 48347.98 -.762 196 .447
Meanva90 41751.33 41639.43 -.068 196 .946
Bl9080 .1164 .1083 -.649 196 .517
Popchg 227.7716 273.5803 .681 196 .497
Hsld9080 92.3766 87.4191 -.221 196 .825
Inco9080 -.122447 -.0898 .848 196 .398
Chgrelco .8262 1.8502 1.535 196 .126
Agmi9080 .00992 -.00832 .637 196 .525
Pro9080 .02675 .02239 -.712 196 .477
Propfc .02843 .03152 1.721 196 .087
Appendix D: Correlations of Interval Level Variables in the Models
Variable a 1 2 3 4
1. Monthdel
2. Notelife .122
3. Ltv .017 -.279**
4.Valu9080 .216** .121 -.050
5. Probl80 -.184* -.037 .145* .158*
a See Table 1 for description of variables
* p < .05, **p < .01
